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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
—000O000-

BUSHCO, d.b.a
Escorts, et al.

Babydolls

Plaintiffs,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
et al.,

Appeal No: 20070559-SC

Defendants.
-000O000-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2 (j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Is Utah Code Ann. Title 59 Chapter 27 a content- based regulation which
violates the rights of Defendants to free speech under The First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution?
This issue was preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Motion for summary

Judgment herein. R. 738-786. Review of summary Judgment is a review of legal
conclusions; and the review is for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America.
Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
2. What standard of Review is correct, in determining the constitutionality of
this act?
This issue was preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Motion for summary
Judgment herein. R. 738-786. Review of Summary Judgment is a review of legal
conclusions; and the review is for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America.
Inc.. 814P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT
ISSUE
Pertinent Constitutional and statutory provisions, including the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. Title 59
Chapter 27, and the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Title 78 Chapter 33 are included
in the Appendix hereto.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case
This is a facial challenge to Utah Code Ann. Title 59 chapter 27, which levies
2

a 10% "gross receipts tax" on "sexually explicit businesses and escort services".
Plaintiffs are businesses which feature nude or semi-nude dancers, or which provide
escort services, and which either are, or might become, subject to the tax. Plaintiffs
contend that the tax is a content-based "burden" on their rights to free expression
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This action is brought under the
Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, § 78-33-2 U.C.A. The trial court originally ruled
that it had no jurisdiction to hear this matter, as Plaintiffs had not exhausted their
administrative remedies before the Utah State Tax Commission. That ruling was
reversed by the Court of Appeals in TDM. Inc. v. Tax Commission 2004 UT App
433,103 P.3d 190 (Utah App. 2004); Cert Denied 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), which
remanded this case for a decision on the merits. The District Court then granted
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that the statute is not content
based, but is a proper response to the problem of "negative secondary effects".
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2004, the Utah Legislature passed HB 239 entitled "Sexually Explicit
Business and Escort Service Tax", and enacting Utah Code Ann. Title 59 Chapter 27.
R. 16-23. Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102 defines an "escort" as "any individual who
is available to the public for the purpose of accompanying another individual for
3

companionship" and obtains a fee for such service. An "escort service" is defined as
"any person who furnishes or arranges for an escort to accompany another individual
for companionship" for a fee. R. 17-18. The same section defines a "nude or
partially denuded individual" as someone "with any of the following less than
completely and opaquely covered: (a) genitals; (b) the pubic region; or (c) a female
breast below a point immediately from the top of areola." A "sexually explicit
business" is defined as "a business at which any nude or partially denuded individual,
regardless of whether the nude or partially denuded individual is an employee of the
sexually explicit business or an independent contractor, provides any service" for a
fee, and for at least 30 days during a calendar year." Id
§ 59-27-103 enacts a tax "equal to 10% of amounts paid to, or charged by,
sexually explicit businesses as defined therein. § 59-27-104 of the Act enacts a
similar tax for escort agencies. The tax is to be a "gross receipts tax" on all income
for the businesses defined in the Act. R. 18-20.

§ 59-27-106 requires businesses

subject to the tax to maintain adequate books and records to enable Defendants to
levy and collect the taxes. R.21. Pursuant to § 59-27-105, certain portions of the
money raised are earmarked for investigation or treatment of sex offenses or
offenders. R. 20-21.
4

At the House Committee hearing, held on February 3,2004, the bill's sponsor,
Rep. Duane Bordeaux, was joined by Kathy Okey, an employee of the Department
of Corrections. While Ms. Okey appeared to testify as an expert on sex offenders, she
was not introduced as such, and presented no credentials which would lead an
average person ro bleive she had such expertise. Rep. Bordeaux spoke of a need for
more therapy resources for sex offenders, and said: "A special tax for a special
purpose is not a regressive tax, nor does it place a burden on disadvantaged
populations." R. 130. Ms. Okey spoke of the number of offenders and the need in the
correction system for more funding for therapy. She stated, concerning convicted sex
offenders: "Without additional funding for treatment, it makes it an increased danger
to the community." R. 131. Ms. Okey also said:
I also think it important to point out that there is a cause and effect here. While
most people who utilize sexually explicit businesses don't commit sex
offenses, the vast majority of sex offenders utilize these kinds of services. So
there is a cause and effect there that perhaps they should pay some of that
burden. There was an analysis done by Hanson and Busia [apparently should
be "Hanson and Bussiere"] of sex offenders in the United States, Canada and
Great Britain. The third top factor that indicates a sex offender's risk is
paraphilias. Utilizing these types of services in one example of paraphilias.
R.133-134.
In answer to a question about the term she used, she defined the term "paraphilia" as
follows:
5

A paraphilia is an unusual sexual interest that you really have an obsession
with. The ones that most people joke about is like women's shoes or feathers
or those kinds of things would be examples. But it is an unusual interest in
something. It's not necessarily illegal but generally people [who] have one
type of that kind of interest also have others. With sex offenders, it's one of
the things that it's a huge risk factor for them. R. 134.
In answer to a question as to whether there was evidence that sex offenders
used escort services, Ms. Okey stated further:
Accessing escort services or stripper bars is a type of paraphilia and they didn't
divide at this percentage. It's just that paraphilia is one of the top contributors
when you are looking if someone is going to re-offend. If they have paraphilia,
this, it's one of the top things that you look at. T. 138.

Upon passage, and at the request of the sponsor, the House added intent
language to buttress that position after the bill had passed the Utah House of
Representatives:
It is the intent of this act to tax sexually explicit businesses and escort services
to provide a revenue for treating individuals who have been convicted of sex
offenses. The provisions of this act have neither the intent nor the effect of
imposing a limitation or restriction on the content of any communicative
material, including sexually oriented materials. Similarly it is not the intent nor
the effect of the act to restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented
materials protected by the First Amendment. Or to deny access by the
distributers and exhibitor of sexually oriented entertainment to their intended
market. Neither is the intent nor the effect of this act to condone or legitimize
the distribution of obscene material.
For the legislature finds the Supreme Court of the United State has upheld the
6

regulation of sexually oriented businesses because ofthe deleterious effect they
have on the community. Sexually oriented business, it is in the best interest of
the citizens of this state to provide counseling to individuals who have
committed a sex offense. Most sex offenders continue to commit sex offenses
if they do not receive treatment. Sex offender treatment is expensive. If an
offender has to pay for treatment, restitution and normal living expenses, they
generally cannot afford treatment. It is reasonable to tax sexually explicit
businesses and escort services in order to provide counseling for individuals
who have committed a sex offense. R. 126-127.
Plaintiffs in this action originally included three semi-nude dancing
establishments licensed by the State of Utah to present such entertainment in
conjunction with the sale of alcoholic beverages, as they were among businesses
which received notices that they were likely to be subject to the tax, and should
commence paying the tax with their sales tax payments. Defendants later conceded
that Plaintiffs who had valid liquor licenses from the State, and who were in
compliance with the "dress requirements" set by the State, should not be subject to
the tax. R. 601. These requirements include that the nipple and areole be opaquely
covered, as well as a prohibition on the displaying of the " genitals, pubic area and
anus." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-602.

The Tax Commission made a similar

determination concerning American Bush, Inc., which does not deal in alcoholic
beverages, but observes similar rules regarding the dress of performers. According
to correspondence from Defendant's counsel, the decisions of the Tax Commission
7

not to impose the tax on these Plaintiffs and former Plaintiffs "was not based on the
type of dancing but rather on the amount of dress." R.602-603.
American Bush, Inc. previously featured full nudity in its dancing, but was
required to restrict its dancers to semi-nude under an ordinance passed in 2001.
American Bush now complies with costume requirements which would be required
of establishments which sell alcoholic beverages. This party, however, seeks to
comply only with the less restrictive Ordinance requirements, without being subject
to this additional tax. R. 1080-1083. Defendants have made it clear that a change in
the attire would trigger the tax. Plaintiff Denali, L.L.C. does present a dance show
in Salt Lake City featuring full nudity. As such, it is the only establishment of which
Plaintiffs are aware, in the State of Utah, subject to the "sexually explicit business"
tax based solely on the lack of adequate attire on its dancers. R. 1177-1180.
Plaintiffs Bushco, Inc., and Valley Recreation, Inc., provide services, on an
individual basis, of entertainers and escorts as defined by the Salt Lake CityM Sexually
Oriented Business "SOB" ordinance, Title 5, Chapter 60 of the Salt Lake City Code.
(Bush and Reynolds Aff s.) Plaintiff D. House, L.L.C, at the time this action was
filed, provided services, on an individual basis, of entertainers and escorts as licensed
by the City of Park City. (Curtis Aff.) This Plaintiff has now relocated to Midvale,
8

in Salt Lake County, and is licensed by that City under its SOB Ordinance. These
Plaintiffs filed affidavits which stated that their services were similar to those of the
other establishments. Joe Bush, in behalf of Plaintiff Bushco, stated:
4. That he also supplies entertainers for bachelor parties and other events, and
this constitutes a substantial part of his business. This entertainment is
primarily dancing entertainment similar to that provided by other Plaintiffs in
their establishments.
5. That he believes his business contains expressive elements protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as elements of free
association, also protected by the Constitution. R. 320.
Based on the affidavits, the trial Court ruled that:
The escort service Plaintiffs are entitled to First Amendment protection
because they incorporate dancing services; thus for purposes of these crossmotions all the Plaintiffs will be treated as if they are entitled to the same First
Amendment protection. R. 1207.
The trial Court nevertheless ruled in favor of Defendants; as it found the law not to
infringe on those First Amendment rights.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This an action seeking to declare the "Sexually Explicit Business and Escort
Service Tax unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. Nude and seminude dancing has constitutional protection from "content based" regulation. Further,
9

this act is overbroad as it taxes the right to free expression and includes much
constitutionally protected activity.
The "Power to tax is the power to destroy" and this act is unlawful censorship.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that a content based tax violates the
First Amendment and cannot be sustained.
Because this is a content based tax, it is to be reviewed by the Courts using
strict scrutiny. Such strict scrutiny allows the tax to be sustained only if it is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
interest. This tax does not meet that high standard as the target of the tax is not
necessary to, or reasonably related to, the goal of raising revenue.
The tax is not aimed at "negative secondary effects" and is not designed to
eliminate or lessen those effects. Therefore, it does not meet the requirements of
"intermediate scrutiny", and cannot be upheld on that basis.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NUDE AND SEMI-NUDE DANCING IS PROTECTED UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
This Court refused to recognize nude dancing as expression for purposes of

10

State Constitutional protections under Article I § 15, in American Bush v. City of
South Salt Lake. 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006). Inexplicably, this Court
seemed to repudiate a long line of cases where the Court invited litigants to argue the
merits of their claims under the Constitution of Utah, and in which the Court
previously stated that the protection of Article I § 15 is "by its terms somewhat
broader than the federal clause". Provo City v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah
1989). Nevertheless, in West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1005-1006
(Utah 1994), this Court recognized the "primacy model" in which Federal
constitutional protections form a "broad uniform' floor' or uniform level of protection
that State law must respect." Therefore, whatever personal opinions are held by
members of this Court regarding the merits of nude dancing as artistic expression, it
must be recognized as subject to First Amendment protection. Furthermore, this case
can be distinguished from American Bush v. South Salt Lake as this law is aimed at
all nudity in entertainment, and is much wider in its application. As will be shown,
this Court should have little trouble holding that the instant statute is
unconstitutionally overbroad without revisiting its previous ruling. The South Salt
Lake "Sexually Oriented Business" Ordinance at issue there surely was contentbased. But it was directed only at adult businesses which were claimed to cause or
11

exacerbate the dreaded"secondary effects".
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on a number of occasions that speech need
not be political to be protected by the First Amendment. See Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948) (fiction in magazines) and Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495
(1952) (movies). And expression is protected even when not verbal. See Tinker v.
Pes Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 367 (1989). The Court, in California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109 0972) ruled
that dancing, like theatrical productions, might be entitled to First Amendment
protection. In that case, however, the Court upheld an ordinance regulating dancing
or performances in an establishment licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, under the
Twenty-first Amendment, which gives State the power to regulate alcoholic
beverages. In the case of Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc.. 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court
recognized First Amendment protection for topless dancing in places not selling
alcohol. The Court, however, indicated that there are limited protections for such
types of dancing. The Court said:
Although the customary "bar room" type of nude dancing may involve only the
barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v.
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109,118,93 S.Ct. 390,397,34 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1972), that this
form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment
protection under some circumstances.
12

In the present case, the challenged ordinance applies not merely to places
which serve liquor, but to many other establishments as well. The District
Court observed, we believe correctly:
The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing
in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing in "any public
place" with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to the interpretation of
the term "any public place" it could include the theatre, town hall, opera
house, as well as a public market place, street or any place of assembly,
indoors or outdoors. Thus, the ordinance would prohibit the
performance of the "Ballet Africans'" and a number of other works of
unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance. 364
F.Supp. at 483. 422 U.S. at 931.
The Court invalidated the ordinance prohibiting nude dancing without alcohol,
as overbroad as it would also apply to more "artistic" productions. This is exactly the
case this Court is faced with here. The statute at issue is not directed at the
"customary 'bar room' type of nude dancing [that] may involve only the barest
minimum of protected expression". Instead, it is directed at any production which
may involve nudity, as will be explored more fully below.
In the case of 44 Liquor Mart. Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S.Ct.
1495 (1996), the Supreme Court explicitly overruled California v. LaRue, and stated:
Without questioning the holding in LaRue. we now disavow its reasoning
insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment. As we explained in a case
decided more than a decade after LaRue. although the Twenty-first
Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's
13

regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its
borders,"the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations
under other provisions of the Constitution." 116 S.Ct. at 1514.
The question of nude dancing as protected expression was again addressed by
the Supreme Court in Schad v. Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In this case, an
adult bookstore expanded its facility to include live nude dancing. The Borough of
Mount Ephraim, New Jersey outlawed any such entertainment. The Supreme Court
found the ordinance overbroad in that it would prohibit much constitutionally
protected expression, as would the instant law. The Doran and Schad decisions
continue to be quoted with approval, through the most recent nude dancing cases.
Federal courts have allowed "reasonable time, place and manner restrictions"
on businesses featuring nude dancing. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre. Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991)and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. 277 (2000), Once again, both the
plurality and the dissent cited approvingly both Doran and Schad. The plurality
opinion of Justice O'Connor stated:
As we explained in Barnes, however, nude dancing of the type at issue here is
expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer ambit
of the First Amendment's protection. See Barnes v. Glen Theater. Inc.. 501
U.S. at 565-566 (plurality opinion); Schad v. Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61,66
(1981).
To determine what level of scrutiny applies to the ordinance at issue here, we
14

must decide "whether the State's regulation is related to the suppression of
expression." Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989); See also United
States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. at 377. If the governmental purpose in enacting the
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of expression, then the regulation
need only satisfy the "less stringent" standard from O'Brien for evaluating
restrictions on symbolic speech. Texas v. Johnson. Supra, at 403; United
States v. O'Brien. Supra, at 377. If the government interest is related to the
content of the expression, however, then the regulation falls outside the scope
of the O'Brien test and must be justified under a more demanding standard.
Texas v. Johnson. Supra, at 403. 529 U.S. at 289.
The Court then went on to look at the ordinance of the City of Erie. In doing
so, the Court noted:
The ordinance here, like the statute in Barnes, is on its face a general
prohibition on public nudity. 553 Pa., at 354, 719 A.2d, at 277. By its terms,
the ordinance regulates conduct alone. It does not target nudity that contains
an erotic message: rather it bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that
nudity is accompanied by expressive activity. And like the statute in Barnes,
the Erie ordinance replaces and updates provisions of an "Indecency and
Immorality" ordinance that has been on the books since 1866, predating the
prevalence of nude dancing establishments such as Kandyland. IcL at 290.
(Emphasis added).
The statute at issue here is directed at nudity that is "accompanied by
expressive activity"; and it does not apply only to adult businesses featuring nude or
semi-nude dancing. It does not purport to affect public nudity. The Seventh Circuit
Court, in Schultz v. City of Cumberland. 228 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2000), a case
involving fully nude dancing, decided after City of Erie, said:
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Although once furiously debated, it is now well-established that erotic dancing
of the sort practiced at the Island Bar enjoys constitutional protection as
expressive conduct. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M..
U.S.
, 120 S.Ct.
1382, 1385 (2000); Miller v. Civil City of South Bend. 904 F.2d 1081, 1087
(7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Barnes v. Glen Theatre. Inc..
501 U.S. 560 (1991). Of course, no one argues that erotic dancing at the Island
Bar represents high artistic expression, but "[n]ude barroom dancing, though
lacking in artistic value, and expressing ideas and emotions different from
those of more mainstream dances, communicates them, to some degree
nonetheless." Miller. 904 F.2d at 1087. The Supreme Court has agreed,
explaining that "nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct,
although . . . it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's
protection." Erie. 120 S.Ct. at 1391 (addressing nude barroom dancing); see
also Barnes. 501 U.S. at 566 (u[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be
performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so."). Moreover, "[s]exual
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment." Sable Communications of California. Inc. v. FCC. 492 U.S.
115, 126 (1989). Entertainment may not be prohibited "solely because it
displays the nude human figure. '[N]udity alone' does not place otherwise
protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment." Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (citations omitted). 228
F.3dat839.
Despite challenging some of the assertions by the City concerning an ordinance
targeted at nude dancing, the Court approved the "de minimus" requirement that
dancers wear pasties and g-strings. See, however, Nakatomi Investments. Inc. v. City
of Schenectady. 949 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) which discusses at length the
"content-based" censorship efforts which attempt to differentiate between "barroomtype" nude dancing and "real" art, such as ballet, and which invalidated an ordinance
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designed to prohibit fully nude dancing in adult establishments. The recent Eleventh
Circuit case of Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton v. Manatee County. 337 F.3d 1251
(11th Cir. 2003) gave thorough treatment to the legal history, and constitutional
protection, of exotic dancing. Litigation continues over whether the specter of
"secondary effects" may restrict dance establishments from full nudity in their
presentation, but the question does seem settled that there are First Amendment
implications which will affect the ability of the State to directly tax the message.
POINT II
THE TAX IS A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. IT IS A CONTENT
BASED BURDEN ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FREE EXPRESSION;
AND IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.
This Court has supported a broad use of the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act
to "determine a question of construction or validity arising under, inter alia 'a statute
[or a] municipal ordinance."9 Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. Of Health, 709 P.2d
1159, 1161 (Utah 1985). In order for a declaratory judgment to be granted, there
must be "a justiciable controversy based upon an accrued set of facts, an actual
conflict, adverse parties, a legally protectable interest on the plaintiffs part, and an
issue ripe for judicial resolution." Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah
1993). Certainly this dispute meets all of those specifications.
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This is a facial attack on the tax statute in its entirety on the grounds that the
tax violates the rights of Plaintiffs and others under the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. This Court has the power to review the acts of the Utah
Legislature and to determine whether those acts are within the constitutional power
of the legislature to enact. State v. Green. 2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004).
Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare Title 59 Chapter 27 U.C. A. as enacted by the 2004
Utah Legislature, unconstitutional in its entirety, and therefore null and void.
Further, Plaintiffs are entitled to assert the rights of those not before the Court
under Provo City v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989). There, this Court dealt with
a facial challenge to a City ordinance, based on First Amendment violations. §
12.45.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Provo City provided:
UNLAWFUL SEX ACTS.(a) it shall be unlawful for any person in public or
in a public place, to exhibit or expose his or her genitals, or to engage in, or to
solicit another to engage in, any sexual conduct as defined herein. Id at 456,
fn.L
The Court discussed the issue of standing to make a facial challenge:
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share with the federal courts is the
basic requirement that the complainant show 'some distinct and palpable
injury that gives him [or her]
a personal stake in the outcome of the legal
5
dispute." There is no question that Willden meets this standing test. He has
been convicted and sentenced under the ordinance he challenges.
He
indisputably has standing to challenge the ordinance, at least as it has been
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applied to him.
However, Willden's challenge is more sweeping. He contends that the
ordinance as written sweeps so broadly in its prohibitions that it criminalizes
behavior protected by the first amendment and, therefore, should be struck
down as being invalid on its face, even if his particular conduct could properly
be criminalized. In support of his claim of standing to challenge the ordinance
on its face - in effect, to assert the first amendment rights of others not before
the court whose conduct could not be criminalized consistent with the first
amendment Willden relies on the federal first amendment "overbreadth"
standing doctrine, designed to give standing to anyone who is subject to an
overbroad statute that chills the exercise of first amendment rights of others.
The rational for granting such standing is that the constitutionally protected
interests infringed by such statutes are so important that their protection need
not await the perfect plaintiff. (Internal Citations omitted) 768 P.2d at 457.
The overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases was explained in
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609(1973):
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space
and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First
"Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered
legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to
together compelling needs of society. Herndon v. Lowry. 301 U.S. 242, 258
(9137); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Grayned v. City of
Rockford. 408 U.S., at 116-117. As a corollary, the Court has altered its
traditional rules of standing to permit - in the First Amendment area - "attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with the requisite narrow specificity." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 3 80 U.S., at 486.
Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute because their own right
of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or
assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
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(Emphasis Added).
Appellant American Bush, Inc. challenges the tax that would be imposed if
it reduced the amount of attire worn by its dancers, as it is allowed to do under the
controlling Ordinance in South Salt Lake. It has been exempted from the tax by
Defendants, based on the attire being worn at the present time. The tax is, by
definition, content-based.

The First Amendment rights of the escort agency

Appellants have been recognized by the District Court in its ruling above, and by the
cities under which they are licensed to provide services. The Salt Lake City
"Sexually Oriented Business (SOB) Ordinance provides:
5.61.085 LEGITIMATE ARTISTIC MODELING.
A. The city does not intend to unreasonably or improperly prohibit legitimate
modeling which may occur in a state of nudity for purposes protected by the
first amendment or similar state protections. The city does intend to prohibit
prostitution and related offenses occurring under the guise of nude modeling.
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 5.61.21 OK of this chapter, a
licensed outcall employee may appear in a state of nudity before a customer or
patron providing that a written contract for such appearance was entered into
between the customer or patron and the employee and signed at least twenty
four (24) hours before the nude appearance. All of the other applicable
provisions of this chapter shall still apply to such nude appearances.
B. In the event of a contract for nude modeling or appearance signed more than
forty eight (48) hours in advance of the modeling or appearance, the individual
to appear nude shall not be required to obtain a license pursuant to this chapter.
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The performance restrictions legitimatize a performance by a fully nude model,
dancer or performer, under certain circumstances. The City has thus recognized First
Amendment protections for even sexually-charged performances involving full
nudity. See the similar provisions of §5.56.060 of the Midvale City Code; §28A-8 of
the Murray City Code, §4-9-8 of the Park City Code and §5.136.085 of the Salt Lake
County Code.
The challenge to this statute is based on the fact that it is targeted towards
protected First Amendment activity; and it is done so in a cynical attempt to impose
censorship on activity of which a majority of the legislature disapproves. A more
general tax used to raise the money sought for therapy and for other purposes of
rehabilitation and public safety, would be constitutionally sound; but one which is
directed narrowly at disapproved content violates the constitution. Certainly, an
earmarked tax such as the Zoo, Arts and Parks tax (ZAP) is a valid use of the taxing
power. The ZAP tax, of course, is aimed evenly at ah similar businesses. It does not
allow the Tax Commission to single out only the businesses where "decent people"
would not go. It does not punish people on the basis of a perceived propensity to do
evil. If a reasonably calculated tax were levied on all personal services and/or all
entertainment in the State, Plaintiffs would feel vindicated. Until then, they urge this
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Court to declare the law at issue an unconstitutional invasion of their rights and an
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution of Utah.

Plaintiffs also seek a refund of all amounts paid by any

Plaintiff herein to the Tax Commission pursuant to the terms of the Act. The U. S.
Supreme Court has held that "the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod vs.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377 (1976). This Court must determine that the statute is an
unconstitutional burden on Plaintiffs' free speech rights, and that it subjects the free
speech of the public at large to a constitutionally impermissible "chill".
The Tax Commission has so far only attempted to apply this tax to "adult
businesses. "Legitimate" artists may feel safe from this tax. The Tax Commission
might not pursue an art school or a "legitimate theater" to pay this tax, because their
clientele are a "better class of people". Such assumptions are constitutionally infirm
and there is no support in the statutory language for making such distinctions.1

1

The Republican Caucus in the Utah House of
Representatives announced in l a t e 2005, a paid "speed dating"
event in which l o b b y i s t s would pay for "face time" with
individual l e g i s l a t o r s . Deseret News, Dec. 2, 2005. Some have
suggested t h a t t h i s amounts to an unlicensed e s c o r t s e r v i c e .
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Because the tax is thus clearly aimed at the message, and not at "secondary effects",
the law is subject to strict scrutiny.
During hearings before the Utah House Committee on Revenue and Taxation,
a question was asked as to whether the tax would be applied to a theater that might
feature nudity in one of its plays. The sponsor, of course, indicated that was not likely
R. 135-136. He gave no basis for his opinion; and the "plain language" of the Statute
is to the contrary. If a commercial theatrical production features nudity for more than
30 days, the tax measure by its terms applies to the theater, on a permanent basis,
whether or not the nudity is featured in another play during that year. Likewise, if two
theatrical releases had some nudity in them, and each only lasted 15 days, the theater
would be branded, at least for the entire tax year, and quite possibly on a permanent
basis. Counsel for Plaintiffs has attended at least one play at the Salt Lake Acting
Company where there was brief nudity. The Capitol Theater hosted a production of
the well known Broadway play, "Oh Calcutta" which featured an abundance of
nudity. While the theater itself is owned by the County and may be exempt from the
tax, the company that produced the musical was privately owned. If a play similar to
"Oh Calcutta" stayed for at least a month, the company that presented it would be
subject to the tax, by its terms. Likewise, Kingsbury Hall at the University of Utah
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played host to a revival of the irreverent 60fs musical "Hair" which has a nude scene.
The play was privately produced, although the theater belongs to the State. Once
again, the tax would apply by its terms if the play stayed for a month, or two such
separate productions were held within a calendar year.
While there are no "landed clubs" affiliated with the American Association of
Nude Recreation (formerly American Sunbathing Association) in Utah at this time,
the tax obviously would affect such old line "nudist camps" if one attempted to open
in Utah. A friend of counsel's recently agreed to do occasional nude modeling for a
private art school in the Salt Lake Valley for serious art students. The tax clearly
applies if such modeling is done for more than 30 days during a calendar year.
The Tax Commission may not to attempt to tax these entities, as it has only sent
notices to those who it has determined are in the "adult entertainment" business. That
is despite the fact that the law imposes the tax on all those who perform an service
while in a State of nudity, for 30 days out of the year. Seemingly, the only basis for
such a decision would be the value judgment that nudity at an art school is "good"
and nudity (or semi-nudity) at a bar or other adult entertainment facility is "bad". See
again Nakatomi Investments.

The tax is constitutionally overbroad, as it covers

much constitutionally protected behavior. As in Doran, the act "would prohibit [tax]
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the performance of the "Ballet Africans'" and a number of other works of
unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance." Courts that have upheld
prohibitions on nude dancing have clearly focused on "the customary 'bar room" type
of nude dancing" (Doran); " erotic dancing of the sort practiced at the Island Bar"
(Schultz); " nude dancing of the type at issue here" (City of Erie). This statute does
not confine itself to such venues. It aims directly at nudity, in whatever form it may
appear; and as such it is in violation of the First Amendment.
Perhaps the most insidious thing about the tax is the cavalier attitude the
Defendants are allowed take. They will tax who they please; and they will change
their minds about who is included whenever it pleases them. The Supreme Court has
rejected regulations where "unbridled discretion" to issue a business license has been
left to the licensing authority. In FW/PBS. Inc. v. Dallas. 493 U.S. 215 (1990) the
Court said:
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance
which ... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution
guarantees contingent upon on the uncontrolled will of an official — as by
requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the
discretion of such official — is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint
upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. 493 U.S. at 226.

See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147(1969) and Lakewood v.
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Plain Dealer Publishing Co.. 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988) where the Court said:
Therefore, a facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government
official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or view
point of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.
Because the tax obviously gives the State Tax Commission leeway to decide between
the agood guys" and the "bad guys", it is censorship, viewpoint discrimination and
prior restraint in its worst form. Clearly this statute is overbroad by its terms. And
just as clearly, Defendants will apply it as they seem fit, from time to time. If a
"legitimate" theatre features nudity in a production, maybe they will be taxed; and
maybe they won't. There appears to be no way to tell; and this fact constitutes a
substantial "chill" on First Amendment rights. The tax should be stricken in its
entirety as wholly inconsistent with First Amendment principles.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD USE A STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD TO REVIEW
THIS STATUTE.
The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, attached a note to the bill
as introduced, dated December 22, 2003:
This bill imposes a tax on sexually explicit businesses and escort services, and
might be challenged as violating the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a case addressing
taxation of sexually explicit businesses or escort services, but has decided
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cases involving a tax on other activities protected by the First Amendment.
Under those rulings, if this bill is challenged, a court would first determine
whether sexually explicit businesses and escort services are obscene, and not
protected by the First Amendment. If a court decides they are not obscene, and
are therefore protected by the First Amendment, the court could uphold the bill
if the court determined that the tax is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest, and is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. (Emphasis added).
R.83.
Semi-nude dancing in bars has long been approved by statute; and
establishments featuring such dancing have been determined by Defendants not to be
subject to this tax. Plaintiffs know of no attempt anywhere to determine that such
dancing, or nude dancing, which is, or has been, specifically licensed by the State or
its subdivisions, is obscene. The legislature's own attorneys agree that this law deals
with expressive conduct which is protected by the First Amendment. According to
them, it is thus subject to strict scrutiny, and will not be upheld without a showing of
a compelling State interest. The legislature struggled to show such an interest by
inserting intent language. This language does nothing to save this bill from itself.
There is no explanation of the statement that it "is reasonable to tax sexually explicit
businesses. . . in order to provide counseling". There is no attempt to explain the
definition of "sexually explicit entertainment", which includes much constitutionally
protected material. The burden to the State to sustain such a statement is very high;
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and the State has made no real attempt to meet it.
The U.S. Supreme Court, back in 1819, stated: "That the power of taxing it by
the States may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied."
McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 427 (1819). From that, we get the
oft repeated statement that "the power to tax is the power to destroy."

Since then,

the Supreme Court has stricken several attempts to tax speech, as a violation of the
First Amendment. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) the Court
invalidated a license law which required members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to
obtain a license before distribution pamphlets from door to door.

While the

Witnesses asked for a set contribution for the pamphlets, they often gave them away
to interested persons. The Court said :
The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states,
declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press . . . " It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically
on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional. Yet the license
tax imposed by this Ordinance is in substance just that. 319 U.S. at 108.
In Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev..460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983),
the Supreme Court invalidated a "use tax" on paper and ink used by newspapers. In
doing so, the Court said:
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Further, differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic
of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to the
suppression of expression and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely. 408 U.S. 92,95-96 (1972);
cf. Brown v. Hartlage. 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (First Amendment has its "fullest
and most urgent" application in the case of regulation of the content of political
speech). Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the
interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such
treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling
importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation. (Emphasis
added).
The main interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of revenue.
Of course that interest is critical to any government. Standing alone, however,
it cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of
achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First
Amendment is clearly available; the State could raise the revenue by taxing
businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles
out the press.
The Supreme Court, in Arkansas Writers1 Project, Inc. v. Ragland. 481 U.S.
221 (1987), invalidated a discriminatory tax on certain magazines, in the State of
Arkansas. There, the Court held:
As we stated in that case, f,[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." 481 U.S. at 230.
The Court reiterated that such a tax must pass strict scrutiny:
...the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
State interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id. at 231.
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The Supreme Court, in Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd.. 502 U.S. 105
(1991), stated that:
A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes
a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech. As we
emphasized in invalidating a content-based magazine tax, "official scrutiny of
the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely
incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press."
This is a notion so ingrained in our First Amendment jurisprudence that last
Term, we found it so "obvious" as to not require explanation. It is but one
manifestation of a far broader principle: "Regulations which permit the
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot
be tolerated under the First Amendment." 502 U.S. at 115-116. (Emphasis
added).
The Court there found the New York State "Son of Sam" law to be a contentbased statute, because "it singles out income derived from expressive activity for a
burden the State places on no other income, and is directed only at works with a
specified content." Id at 116. The expressive activity in this case is dancing, and
the discrimination is against the forum used, that of an establishment which features
nudity "during at least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive [sic] days during a calendar
year". The burden is not restricted to the nude dancing itself, as the tax continues
even if the venue changes its fare after 30 days. The Supreme Court, in Simon &
Schuster, imposed the compelling interest test on the State, and found it lacking.
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Such a test should also be imposed here, and such an interest has not been shown.
In the more recent case of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.. 535 U.S. 425,
445 (2002) Justice Kennedy, concurring in the result and providing the fifth vote to
support the plurality, cited Arkansas Writers, and applied the principles to a zoning
ordinance affecting adult businesses:
On the other hand, a city may not regulate the secondary effects of speech by
suppressing the speech itself. A city may not, for example, impose a content
based fee or tax. This is true even if the government purports to justify the fee
by reference to the secondary effects. Though the inference may be inexorable
that a city could reduce secondary effects by reducing speech, this is not a
permissible strategy. The purpose and effect of a zoning ordinance must be to
reduce secondary effects and not to reduce speech.(Internal citations omitted)
(Emphasis added).
Under the rule of Marks v. United States. 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the opinion of Justice
Kennedy is effectively the opinion of the Court; and this statement is fully supported
by the numerous decisions of the Court cited above.
Licensing fees for adult businesses have been upheld when those fees have
some relationship to the cost of regulating the businesses. The concerns expressed
by the legislature here certainly do not directly relate to the cost of such regulation.
In TK's Video. Inc. v. Denton County. 24 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 1994) the Court
upheld licensing fees for adult businesses and their employees but made it clear that
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it would not sustain a tax such as this one:
Government cannot tax First Amendment rights, but it can exact narrowly
tailored fees to defray administrative costs of regulation. Cox v. New
Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569.576-77,85 L.Ed. 1049.61 S.Ct. 762 (1941). Denton
County requires each business and individual requesting a license to pay
annual fees of $500 and $50 respectively. The district court found these
amounts tied to the cost of investigating applicants and processing licenses.
We agree. (Emphasis added).
See also Acorn Investments. Inc. v. City of Seattle. 887 F.2d 219 (9th Cir.
1989), also invalidating a discriminatory license tax involving adult businesses
where the tax was not proved to be related to the costs of regulating those businesses.
These rulings should not be a surprise in light of early American history, which tells
us that the United States declared its Independence in part in rebellion over the hated
"Stamp Act", which included a tax on newspapers, in a transparent attempt by the
government to control the press.2
The Court, in Boos v. Barry. 485 U.S. 312,320 (1988) distinguished between
laws aimed at "secondary effects" and those which are content based and require
strict scrutiny:
Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience present
a different situation. Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of
2

See The F i r s t Freedom: A H i s t o r y of Free Speech by Robert
Hargreaves.
S u t t o n P u b l i s h i n g (London 2002) p p . 114-115;
206-207.
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"secondary effects" we referred to in Renton. To take an example factually
close to Renton, if the Ordinance there was justified by the City's desire to
prevent the psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult
movies, then analysis of the measure as a content-based statute would have
been appropriate. The hypothetical regulation targets the direct impact of a
particular category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be
associated with that type of speech.
The Supreme Court again, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group.
529 U.S. 803 (2000) reviewed a censorship measure using strict scrutiny. The Court
struck down a Federal statute which required cable systems to fully scramble or block
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" for a substantial
part of each day, to avoid it being seen by children. The Court held:
It is of no moment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibition. The
distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of
degree. The Government's content-based burdens must satisfy the same
rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans.
Since § 505 is content based, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.
E.g., Sable Communications of CaL Inc. v. FCC 492 U.S. 115, 126. If a
statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive alternative
would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative. 529 U.S. at 812- 813. (Emphasis added).
In the recent case of Ashcroft vs. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,253254,152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002), the Court reviewed a Federal statute aimed at
preventing child pornography and stated:
The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient
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reason for banning it. The government "cannot constitutionally premise
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."
Stanley v.Georgia, 294 U.S. 557, 566, 89 S.Ct. 1243,22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969).
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to
control thought or justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to
think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of thought.
The government may not prohibit speech because it increases the chances an
unlawful act will be committed "at some indefinite future time." Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,108,94 S.Ct. 326,38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (per curiam).
The government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech
that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.
Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may
not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage
in illegal conduct.
As with the law stricken by the Court in the Free Speech Coalition case, the tax
at issue here singles out speech for burden because of the supposed possibility that
lawful speech may tend to influence the listener into inappropriate conduct; and this
is an impermissible basis for banning (or taxing) that speech. See also Ward v. Rock
Against Racism. 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) holding that the government "may not
regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not serve to advance its goals." Surely the State cannot justify this tax
on the basis of any compelling State interest. Nor can it show that the statute is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end, and not to unnecessarily interfere with
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expression.
The Supreme Court differentiated between secondary effects regulations, which
require only "intermediate scrutiny", and "primary effects" regulations, which are
subject to strict scrutiny, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. 521 U.S. 844,
867-868:
In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of
residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the
films shown in the theaters, but rather at the "secondary effects" — such as
crime and deteriorating property values ~ that these theaters fostered: "AIt is
th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the
dissemination of "offensive" speech.'" According to the government, the CDA
is constitutional because it constitutes a sort of "cyberzoning" on the internet.
But the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the
purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of
"indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any secondary effects
of such speech. Thus the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech
and, as such, cannot be "properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner
regulation." (Emphasis added).
In U.S. Sound and Service. Inc. v. Township of Brick. 126 F.3d 555 (3rd Cir.
1997), the Court, relying in part on Reno, struck down a zoning law aimed at a video
store which would admittedly be selling or renting adult-oriented tapes. The trial
court had used "intermediate scrutiny" under Renton, and upheld the restriction. The
Court of Appeals found that analysis to be incorrect:
The Township and the Board persuaded the district court that although the
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regulation imposed by the Board's resolution singles out adult entertainment
for special treatment, it is content-neutral because it is aimed not at the
sexually explicit content but rather at the "secondary effect" of that
entertainment on children. Accordingly, the court applied the intermediate
scrutiny test of Renton. Intermediate scrutiny was not appropriate, however,
because "[listeners1 reactions to speech are not the type of "secondary effects"
referred to in Renton". (Emphasis added).
The impact of protected speech on minors is a direct, rather than a secondary,
effect, and a regulation that singles out non-obscene sexually explicit material
because of its impact on minors is not content-neutral.
Because the Township and the Board seek to justify the Board's resolution on
the sole basis of a desire to protect minors from exposure to adult
entertainment, Reno requires that we subject that resolution to strict scrutiny.
The conclusion would not be different, however, if we were persuaded that
Renton supplies the appropriate test. While protecting minors from exposure
to adult entertainment can accurately be characterized as a compelling and
substantial governmental interest, the regulation imposed by the Board's
resolution is neither the least restrictive means of furthering that interest nor
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Accordingly, we conclude that the
Board's resolution restricts protected speech in violation of U.S. Sound's right
to free expression under the First Amendment. 126 F.3d at 558-9.
On October 23, 2007, the Sixth Circuit, in Connection Distributing Co. v.
Keisler.

F.3d.

, Case No. 06-3822 (6th Cir. October 23, 2007) facially

invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 2257, which requires all producers of sexually explicit images
to maintain records regarding the individuals depicted in the images, and to allow the
Government to inspect those records without warning, during regular business hours.
Like this tax, the regulation at issue there did not ban the speech; but the Court held
36

it was a substantial burden on the speech, and not justified by the "compelling
government interest of fighting the scourge of child pornography":
While the government is indeed aiming at conduct, child abuse, it is regulating
protected speech, sexually explicit images of adults, to get at that conduct. To
the extent the government is claiming that a law is considered a conduct
regulation as long as the government claims an interest in conduct and not
speech, the Supreme Court has rejected that argument. See, e.g., Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 150 (1939) (holding that the government cannot ban
handbills, speech, to vindicate its interest in preventing littering, conduct). The
expression here is not conduct, it is speech. Images, including photographs, are
protected by the first Amendment as speech as much as "words in books" and
"oral utterance[s]." Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 147, 119-20 (1973). P.8.
The Court held that the law imposed substantial burdens on speech, including the
right to be anonymous in a sexually explicit photograph; and that the burden was not
justified by reference to the crime of child abuse that it aimed to prevent. Likewise,
the regulation (tax) at issue here (and the record keeping requirements which go with
it) burdens and regulates a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech
without directly affecting its stated objective - to reduce the problems of sexual
offenders. Likewise, the burden on speech is not justified by reference to the
conduct.

Even assuming that the State's rationale had some basis (see below), that

kind of targeting is exactly what the courts have forbidden. Under "strict scrutiny",
a law is valid only if it imposes the least possible burden on expression. See Sable
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Communications. Inc. v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115, 126(1989).
In religious exercise cases, the U.S. Supreme Court previously has used a strict
scrutiny test to review local laws which infringe on religious freedoms. That test was
abandoned in Employment Division v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which allowed
a less stringent test to be used in such cases. Utah courts have apparently retained the
strict scrutiny test, as enunciated in Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998).
Since the free exercise of religion is constitutionally intertwined with free expression,
Plaintiffs believe that the same test will necessarily be applied in cases such as this.
Defendant is attempting to impose censorship; and its assertion that its governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression is subterfuge.
POINT IV
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE INTERMEDIATE
SCRUTINY TEST OF O'BRIEN.
The seminal authority for the application of intermediate scrutiny is United
States, v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In that case, which dealt with the illegal
destruction of a draft card in an act of civil disobedience, the U.S. Supreme Court
determined that a general statute regulating behavior may incidentally burden
expression:
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if it is within the constitutional power of government; if it f u r t h e r s an
important or substantial governmental interest; if governmental interest interest
is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and if the incidental restriction
on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest. 391 U.S. at 377.

The trial Court held that the tax statute at issue here is a proper response to the
problem of "negative secondary effects" associated by some with adult entertainment.
The legislature, however, did not aim at such secondary effects; but attempted to tie
such businesses in with general sexual misconduct in society, with no evidence of
such a connection.
The legal concept of "secondary effects" was enunciated in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc.. 427 U.S. 73 (1976):
The 1972 ordinances were amendments to an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance"
which had been adopted ten years earlier. At that time the Detroit Common
Council made a finding that some uses of property are especially injurious to
a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas. The decision to
add adult Motion picture theaters and adult book stores to a list of businesses
which apart from a special waiver, could not be located within 1,000 feet of
two other "regulated uses," was, in part, a response to the significant growth
in the number os such establishments. In the opinion of urban planners and
real estate experts who supported the ordinances, the location of several such
businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity
and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase
in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to
move elsewhere. 427 U.S. at 54-55.
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling, and also ruled that one City could rely on
the experiences of another in fighting such urban blight, in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), which is the most frequently cited "secondary
effects" case:
The District Court's finding as to the "predominate" intent, left undisturbed by
the Court of Appeals, is more than adequate to establish that the city's pursuit
of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
The Ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's
retail trade, maintain property values, and generally "protec[t] and preserv[e]
the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality
of urban life," not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. 475 U.S. at
48.
The Tenth Circuit Court recently, in Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348
F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003) discussed the necessary record which must accompany an
ordinance directed at "secondary effects":
Around 1999, the City Council became concerned about what are called
'negative secondary effects' - such as crime, prostitution, and lowered property
values - thought to be associated with sexually oriented businesses. For
approximately a year, City officials gathered police reports and studies from
around the country regarding the connection between sexually oriented
commercial business and these secondary effects. Id. at 1185.
The Court, in Heideman cited the Supreme Court case of City of Los Angeles v.
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002) which held that the City's claim of regulating
secondary effects must have a valid basis: "the City certainly bears the burden of
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providing evidence that supports a link between concentrations of adult operations
and asserted secondary effects". Id at 437. And it allowed an affected business to
show a lack of such a link:
This is not to say that the municipality can get away with shoddy data or
reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's
rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast doubt on this rationale,
either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its
rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual
findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If Plaintiffs
succeed in casting doubt on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the
burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence
renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance. IdL at 438-39.
In order to meet this burden, a City enacting a "Sexually Oriented Business" (SOB)
Ordinance almost universally includes a preamble referring to the secondary effects
it claims to be battling; and also a list of "studies" and other authorities it relies upon
in its claim that the Ordinance is a fair attempt to address those effects. The Utah
legislature made no claim that it was dealing with such secondary effects in its
proceedings to pass this bill. No references were made to studies, or other authority;
and no attempt was made to describe the secondary effects or even to refer to them.
Plaintiffs previously submitted to the District Court, one of those "studies" written
by one of the most implacable foes of adult businesses in this country: Dr. Richard
McCleary, a professor of Criminology and Social Ecology at University of California41

Irvine. R. 1127-1139. Dr. McCleary has been presented as an expert witness by
cities across the country to prove that secondary effects exist, and that they must be
dealt with. His work has been cited by several courts, for good and ill.3 His writing
frequently refers to the term "ambient crime risk", the term "ambient" meaning
"surrounding, encircling". American Heritage Dictionary. Houghton Mifflin, New
York, 1991. Dr. McCleary opines that the secondary effects of an adult business are
readily apparent for approximately 500 feet, and then rapidly fall off:
To measure crime risk per unit of time and area, crime incidents reported
within 500 feet of an SOB (or control) address during a fixed period of time are
counted. Crime rates calculated this way can be interpreted as crime
victimization risks.(i.e.„ as the probabilities of victimization) in a circle
centered on an SOB or control.
1. While smaller circular areas (e.g.. a 250-foot radius around an SOB
and/or control) are acceptable in principle, smaller circles often exceed
the precision for the UCR coding system.
2. Larger circular areas (e.g.. a 1500-foot radius around an SOB) suffer
from detectability" problems and tend to "dilute" the estimated effect,
biasing it towards zero. R. 1130-1131.
This is not the same phenomenon preached by Defendants. The theory of "secondary

See D o c t o r J o h n ' s ' , I n c . v . C i t y of S i o u x C i t y , Iowa,
F . S u p p . 2 d 1005 (N.D. Iowa 2 0 0 6 ) ; A b i l e n e R e t a i l # 3 0 , I n c . v .
Board of C o m ' r s of D i c k i n s o n C o u n t y , K a n . , 492 F . 3 d . 1164
(10 t h C i r . 2007) and D a v t o n a G r a n d , I n c . v . C i t y of Davtona
B e a c h , F l o r i d a , 490 F . 3 d 8 6 0 ( l l t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) .
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effects" as accepted by many Federal Courts is confined to a measurable area, and has
nothing in common with the theory propounded by our legislature. Businesses which
do not cater to customers on site (escort services where the client meets the escort
elsewhere) do not have secondary effects. See Voyeur Dorm L.C. v. City of Tampa.
265 F.3d 1232 (11 th Cir. 2001). There is no authority whatsoever for regulating adult
businesses because of the alleged need for sex therapy for some of their customers or
potential customers.
Instead, the legislature heard briefly from Ms. Okey and her references to
"paraphilias". While the bill's sponsor and his cohorts acknowledge that the vast
majority of people who enjoy adult entertainment are not sex offenders, they made
totally unsubstantiated claims that a high percentage of sex offenders have some
history of attending adult entertainment or using the services of escort agencies. The
Supreme Court, in City of Erie, subjected an anti-nudity ordinance to intermediate
scrutiny, based on its conclusion that the ordinance was targeted at the "secondary
effects" associated with nude dancing, and not the message itself: "Put another way,
the ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, Le^,
the effect on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing,. . . ." (Emphasis added)
529 U.S. at 291. Plaintiffs here are subjected to a substantial tax based on the
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unsupported allegation that some of those who view nude dancing there might be
exhibiting a "paraphilia". Ms. Okey seemed pretty sure of herself on this point:" The
third top factor that indicates a sex offender's risk is paraphilias. Utilizing these types
ofservices in one example of paraphilias. R.133-134." Her testimony, however, was
patently false. The authoritative source on such things is the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Fourth Edition, Text Revision, American
Psychiatric Association, 2000; known in the profession as DSM-IV-TR. This
publication defines the term thusly:
The essential features of a Paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects,
2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or
other nonconsenting persons". (IdL, "Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders.")
Thus while that definition would include Ms. Okey's "anecdotes" involving feathers
or women's shoes, it would not include "utilizing these type ofservices." Specific
types of paraphilias identified in the DSM-IV-TR include "exhibitionism" and
"voyeurism". Voyeurism is

defined in § 302.82 as "recurrent, intense sexually

arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving an unsuspecting person who
is naked, in the process of disrobing, or engaging in sexual activity." (Emphasis
added). "Accessing stripper bars" simply does not fit into the description of a
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paraphilia, which by its nature involves "sexual urges or fantasies [which] cause
marked distress or interpersonal difficulty." Id
At the Committee hearing on the bill, Ms. Okey did say that there was some
"anecdotal information" that sex offenders tended to use escort services and "stripper
bars" more often than others (R. 138). In a battle of anecdotes, many observations
and accusations can be made. There is recent "anecdotal information" that Catholic
priests have a particular problem with the youth of their parishes; and the Provo
Herald, June 13,2004, reported that an Episcopal Bishop had just resigned over a sex
abuse scandal in his diocese. A few years ago, several newspapers reported that an
attorney working for a law firm which regularly represented the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints was arrested for soliciting sex from a decoy prostitute in
South Salt Lake. Recently, the pastor of a large Christian church in Montgomery ,
Alabama apparently asphyxiated himself while attempting to sexually gratify himself
.4 If the Utah legislature reacted to all this bad news with a tax on churches (or only
those churches where there was recent news of such events), the Courts would
quickly stop it. Constitutionally, there is no difference between that situation and this
one. The need for more funds for sex offender therapy does not justify using such a
4

Montgomery

(Ala.)

Advertiser,
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June 2007.

wholly unrelated problem as an excuse for censorship. If the State cannot clearly and
convincingly link the problem and the solution, the tax is unconstitutional.
The State cannot show any reasonable relationship between the evil sought to
be ameliorated (sex offenses) and the discriminatory tax that it has imposed on
protected expression. If common paraphilias include collecting women's shoes or
feathers (R. 134), neither of which implicates the First Amendment, why does not the
legislature tax those activities? If the State is claiming a link between the expressive
activities of Plaintiffs and sex offenses, that is not a "secondary effect". It is not a
time, place and manner regulation, but a blanket burden or "abridgment" of protected
speech, and it is aimed at the content of the speech. The sponsor and his witnesses
cited the need for more treatment; but failed in their attempt to show "cause and
effect" .
The challenged tax provisions fail to comport with these requirements in
several respects. Certainly the State has the power to tax and raise revenue. The need
for therapy for those who have been convicted of sexual offenses is not in
controversy. The statute, however, fails both the third and fourth parts of the O'Brien
test. Suppression of expression is a primary reason for drafting of the law in this
manner. It is not mainly a revenue raising measure and is not likely to raise very
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much revenue.

Instead, it places a severe burden on one form of protected

expression. Obviously a broader tax was an option to raise needed treatment funds,
but the focus of this bill was animus towards a form of entertainment some find
distasteful. See the comments of Rep. Philpot (Comm. Tr. p 12-13) on the option of
just banning "pornography, obscenity, these types of things". The Ninth Circuit, in
Tollis v. San Bernardino County. 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) outlined the test:
The district court provided no express finding on the County's predominant
purpose in passing the ordinance. In the particular case before us, however, we
need not decide whether the ordinance is content-neutral because we conclude
that, even if the county's predominant motive was the amelioration of
secondary effects, the ordinance fails to meet the third prong of the Renton test.
To be acceptable as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, an
ordinance must be "designed to serve a substantial government interest and
allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communication." We agree that the
County has a substantial interest in preventing the deleterious secondary
effects often associated with adult theaters. At a minimum, however, there
must be a logical relationship between the evil feared and the method selected
to combat it. 827 F.2d at 1332, 1333.
Under "intermediate scrutiny", the State would be required to show some clear
relationship between this tax and proven harms: and that the measure deals with such
proven harms to a material degree. Since a more general tax would more easily deal
with the need for the additional revenue, there was a political decision that "sinners"
should shoulder the burden. Comments were made on the House floor that this is
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similar to taxes on beer and cigarettes, which merely pay for the damages done by
these evil, but legal, materials. R. 120. Unpopular speech is an easy political target;
but the Constitution does not allow it to be burdened in this manner. The legislature
may not , for instance, tax publishers over newspaper stories of poor working
conditions which may precede labor unrest. It would seem to be easy enough to say
that the press contributed to the cost to taxpayers for police overtime needed to deal
with the unrest; but such a tax is not permissible. Free expression is not always
without its social cost; but that cost must be borne by the citizens at large. A tax on
a point of view is not an option. More direct means are available to deal with the
need for sex therapy; and O'Brien scrutiny requires them to be used.
A censorial regulation is not essential if other effective means of control exist.
In 44 Liquormart the Supreme Court struck down a ban on liquor advertising
because other methods of directly controlling the adverse effects of increased liquor
consumption (such as education and market regulation), were plainly known. In just
such fashion, if the alleged objective is that of providing a needed service to those
who might otherwise cause societal problems, there is a simple and easily available
remedy. See also Utah Licensed Beverage Ass'n. v. Leavitt 256 F.3d 1061 (lO^Cir.
2001) enjoining Utah's advertising restrictions on alcoholic beverages as a violation
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of the First Amendment.
Certainly the regulation does not pass the test of "reasonable belief6 imposed
by Renton and City of Erie. Under Renton v. Playtime Theatres, the challenged
provisions must be justified as a time, place or manner restriction. In order to fully
meet the narrow tailoring required by the fourth prong of intermediate scrutiny under
O'Brien, the incidental restriction must be no greater than is essential and it must
actually be linked to the achievement of the permitted goal. See Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (n. 20) (1983): 'The party seeking to uphold
a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it." See also City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1800
(1993): "It was the city's burden to establish a 'reasonable fitf between its legitimate
interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition
of news racks as the means chosen to serve those interests."
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs urge the Court to determine that there are no material facts in dispute
and that the tax levied against these businesses by Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah
Code is an unlawful prior restraint and a violation of Plaintiffs rights to free
expression under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Declaratory
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Judgment in their favor.
DATED this J / ^ day of November, 2007.
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C.

W. Andrew McCullough
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Addendum A

Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

AMENDMENT XIV
Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868.
Note: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th amendment.
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as
a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but ail such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
* Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment
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(1) collect the tax imposed by Section 59-26-103 from
the purchaser; and
(2) remit the tax collected under Subsection (1) to the
commission:
(a) quarterly on or before the last day of the month
immediately following the last day of each calendar
quarter; and
(b) on a return prescribed by the commission.
2004

59-26-105. Deposit of tax revenue.
The commission shall deposit revenues generated by the tax
imposed by this chapter into the General Fund.
2004
59-26-106.

Records.

(1) A multi-channel video or audio service provider shall
maintain records, statements, books, or accounts necessary to
determine the amount of tax that the multi-channel video or
audio service provider is required to remit to the commission
under this chapter.
(2) The commission may require a multi-channel video or
audio service provider to make or keep the records, statements, books, or accounts the commission considers sufficient
to show the amount of tax for which the multi-channel video or
audio service provider is required to remit to the commission
under this chapter:
(a) by notice served upon that multi-channel video or
audio service provider; or
(b) by administrative rule made in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking
Act.

59-27-101

(a) for the time period for which the commission could
not make an assessment because of the expiration of the
three-year period; and
(b) in an amount equal to the difference between:
(i) the commission's estimate of the amount of tax
the multi-channel video or audio service provider
would have been assessed for the time period described in Subsection (5)(a); and
(ii) the amount of tax the multi-channel video or
audio service provider actually paid for the time
period described in Subsection (5)(a).
(6) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), the commission may not make a credit or refund unless the multichannel video or audio service provider files a claim with
the commission within three years of the date of overpayment.
(b) The commission shall extend the period for a multichannel video or audio service provider to file a claim
under Subsection (6)(a) if:
(i) the three-year period under Subsection (6)(a)
has not expired; and
(ii) the commission and the multi-channel video or
audio service provider sign a written agreement:
(A) authorizing the extension; and
(B) providing for the length of the extension.
2004

59-26-108. Rulemaking authority.
The commission may make rules in accordance with Title
63, Chapter 46a, U t a h Administrative Rulemaking Act, to
implement and enforce this chapter.
2004

(3) After notice by the commission, a multi-channel video or
audio service provider shall open the records, statements,
books, or accounts specified in Subsection (2) for examination
by the commission or a duly authorized agent of the commission.
2004

59-26-109. Penalties and interest.
A multi-channel video or audio service provider that fails to
comply with any provision of this chapter is subject to penalties and interest as provided in Sections 59-1-401 and 59-1-

59-26-107. Action for collection of tax — Action for
refund or Credit of tax.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (5):
(a) the commission shall assess a tax under this chapter within three years after a multi-channel video or audio
service provider files a return; and
(b) if the commission does not assess a tax under this
chapter within the three-year period provided in Subsection (l)(a), the commission may not commence a proceeding to collect the tax.
(2) The commission may assess a tax at any time if a
multi-channel video or audio service provider:
(a) files a false or fraudulent return with intent to
evade; or
(b) does not file a return.
(3) The commission may extend the period to make an
assessment or to commence a proceeding to collect the tax
under this chapter if:
(a) the three-year period under Subsection (1) has not
expired; and
(b) the commission and the multi-channel video or
audio service provider sign a written agreement:
(i) authorizing the extension; and
(ii) providing for the length of the extension.
(4) If the commission delays an audit at the request of a
multi-channel video or audio service provider, the commission
may make an assessment as provided in Subsection (5) if:
(a) the multi-channel video or audio service provider
subsequently refuses to agree to an extension request by
the commission; and
(b) the three-year period under Subsection (1) expires
before the commission completes the audit.
(5) An assessment under Subsection (3) shall be:

59-26-110. Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee
study.
The Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee shall during
the 2004 interim:
(1) study the tax imposed by this chapter;
(2) recommend whether legislation should be drafted to
modify any provision of this chapter; and
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2004

(3) prepare any legislation t h a t the Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee recommends in accordance with
Subsection (2) for consideration by the Legislature during
the 2005 General Session.
2004
CHAPTER 27
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT B U S I N E S S AND ESCORT
SERVICE TAX
Section
59-27-101.
59-27-102.
59-27-103.
59-27-104.
59-27-105.
59-27-106.
59-27-107.
59-27-108.

Title.
Definitions.
Tax imposed on a sexually explicit business —
Tax imposed on an escort service.
Payment of tax.
Sexually explicit business and escort service
fund.
Records.
Action for collection of tax — Action for refund
or credit of tax.
Penalties and interest.

59-27-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Sexually Explicit Business
and Escort Service Tax."
2004

59-27-102

REVENUE AND TAXATION

59-27-102. Definitions.
(1) "Escort" means any individual who is available to the
public for the purpose of accompanying another individual for:
(a) companionship; and
(b) (i) a salary;
(ii) a fee;
(iii) a commission;
(iv) hire;
(v) profit; or
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this
Subsection (l)(b).
(2) "Escort service" means any person who furnishes or
arranges for an escort to accompany another individual for:
(a) companionship; and
(b) (i) a salary;
(ii) a fee;
(iii) a commission;
(iv) hire;
(v) profit; or
(vi) any amount similar to a n amount listed in this
Subsection (2)(b).
(3) "Nude or partially denuded individual" m e a n s an individual with any of the following less t h a n completely and
opaquely covered:
(a) genitals;
(b) the pubic region; or
(c) a female breast below a point immediately above the
top of the areola.
(4) "Sexually explicit business" m e a n s a business at which
any nude or partially denuded individual, regardless of
whether the nude or partially denuded individual is an
employee of the sexually explicit business or a n independent
contractor, performs any service:
(a) personally on the premises of t h e sexually explicit
business;
(b) during at least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive
days within a calendar year; and
(c) for:
(i) a salary;
(ii) a fee;
(iii) a commission;
(iv) hire;
(v) profit; or
(vi) any amount similar to a n amount listed in this
Subsection (4)(c).
2004
59-27-103.

Tax i m p o s e d o n a s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t b u s i n e s s
— Tax i m p o s e d o n a n e s c o r t s e r v i c e .
(1) A tax is imposed on a sexually explicit business equal to
10% of amounts paid to or charged by t h e sexually explicit
business for t h e following transactions:
(a) an admission fee;
(b) a user fee;
(c) a retail sale of tangible personal property made
within the state;
(d) a sale of:
(i) food and food ingredients as defined in Section
59-12-102; or
(ii) prepared food as defined in Section 59-12-102;
(e) a sale of a beverage; and
(f) any service.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a tax is
imposed on an escort service equal to 10% of amounts paid
or charged by the escort service for any transaction t h a t
involves providing an escort to another individual.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), the tax imposed
by Subsection (2)(a) does not apply to a transaction t h a t is
subject to the tax imposed in Subsection (1).
(3) The tax imposed by this section:
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(a) may not be imposed on any sales and use tax
collected or paid u n d e r Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax
Act; and
(b) is subject to an agreement sales and use tax under
Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax Act.
(4) The commission shall administer this chapter in accordance with Chapter 12, P a r t 1, Tax Collection.
2004
59-27-104. P a y m e n t of tax.
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), a sexually explicit business or
escort service subject to t h e tax imposed by this chapter shall
file a return with t h e commission and pay the tax calculated
on the return to t h e commission:
(a) quarterly on or before the last day of the month
immediately following the last day of the previous calendar quarter if:
(i) the sexually explicit business or escort service is
required to file a quarterly sales and use tax return
with the commission under Section 59-12-107; or
(ii) the sexually explicit business or escort service
is not required to file a sales and use tax return with
the commission u n d e r Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax
Act; or
(b) monthly on or before the last day of the month
immediately following the last day of the previous calendar month if t h e sexually explicit business is required to
file a monthly sales and use tax r e t u r n with the commission under Section 59-12-108.
(2) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may make rules to:
(a) establish s t a n d a r d s for determining whether an
operation is a sexually explicit business or escort service;
and
(b) determine, for purposes of Section 59-27-102,
amounts t h a t are similar to an amount paid for:
(i) a salary;
(ii) a fee;
(iii) a commission;
(iv) hire; or
(v) profit.
2004

59-27-105. Sexually explicit business and escort service fund.
(1) There is created a restricted special revenue fund called
the "Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Fund."
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the fund consists of all amounts collected by the commission under
this chapter.
(b) (i) The monies in the fund shall be invested by the
state treasurer p u r s u a n t to Title 51, Chapter 7, State
Money Management Act.
(ii) All interest or other earnings derived from the
fund monies shall be deposited in the fund.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter,
the commission m a y retain an amount of tax collected under
this chapter of not to exceed t h e lesser of:
(a) 1.5%; or
(b) an amount equal to t h e cost to the commission of
administering this chapter.
(4) (a) F u n d monies shall be used as provided in this
Subsection (4).
(b) The D e p a r t m e n t of Corrections shall use 60% of the
monies in t h e fund, in addition to existing budgets, to
provide t r e a t m e n t services to nonworking or indigent
adults who:
(i) have been convicted of an offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, P a r t 4, Sexual Offenses; and
(ii) are not currently confined or incarcerated in a
jail or prison.
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(c) The Adult Probation and Parole section of the Department of Corrections shall use 15% of the monies in
the fund to provide outpatient treatment services to
individuals who:
(i) have been convicted of an offense under Title 76,
Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses; and
(ii) are not currently confined or incarcerated in a
jail or prison.
(d) The Department of Corrections shall use 10% of the
monies in the fund, in addition to existing budgets, to
implement treatment programs for juveniles who have
been convicted of an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5,
Part 4, Sexual Offenses.
(e) The attorney general shall use 15% of the monies in
the fund to provide funding for any task force:
(i) administered through the Office of the Attorney
General; and
(ii) that investigates and prosecutes individuals
who use the Internet to commit crimes against children.
2004
59-27-106. Records.
(1) An owner or operator of a sexually explicit business or
escort service shall maintain records, statements, books, or
accounts necessary to determine the amount of tax for which
the owner or operator is liable to pay under this chapter.
(2) The commission may require an owner or operator of a
sexually explicit business or escort service, by notice served on
the person, to make or keep the records, statements, books, or
accounts described in Subsection (1) in a manner in which the
commission considers sufficient to show the amount of tax for
which the owner or operator is liable to pay under this chapter.
(3) After notice by the commission, the owner or operator of
a sexually explicit business or escort service shall open the
records, statements, books, or accounts specified in this section for examination by the commission or an authorized
agent of the commission.
2004
59-27-107. Action for collection of tax — Action for
refund or credit of tax.
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (5),
the commission shall assess a tax under this chapter
within three years after a sexually explicit business or
escort service subject to the tax imposed by this chapter
files a return.
(b) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (5), if
the commission does not assess a tax under this chapter
within the three-year period provided in Subsection (l)(a),
the commission may not commence a proceeding to collect
the tax.
(2) The commission may assess a tax at any time if a
sexually explicit business or escort service subject to the tax
imposed by this chapter:
(a) files a false or fraudulent return with intent to
evade; or
(b) does not file a return.
(3) The commission may extend the period to make an
assessment or to commence a proceeding to collect the tax
under this chapter if:
(a) the three-year period under Subsection (1) has not
expired; and
(b) the commission and the sexually explicit business
or escort service subject to the tax imposed by this chapter
sign a written agreement:
(i) authorizing the extension; and
(ii) providing for the length of the extension.
(4) If the commission delays an audit at the request of a
sexually explicit business or escort service subject to the tax
imposed by this chapter, the commission may make an assessment as provided in Subsection (5) if:
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(a) the sexually explicit business or escort service subject to the tax imposed by this chapter subsequently
refuses to agree to an extension request by the commission; and
(b) the three-year period under Subsection (1) expires
before the commission completes the audit.
(5) An assessment under Subsection (4) shall be:
(a) for the time period for which the commission could
not make an assessment because of the expiration of the
three-year period; and
(b) in an amount equal to the difference between:
(i) the commission's estimate of the amount of tax
the sexually explicit business or escort service subject
to the tax imposed by this chapter would have been
assessed for the time period described in Subsection
(5)(a); and
(ii) the amount of tax the sexually explicit business
or escort service subject to the tax imposed by this
chapter actually paid for the time period described in
Subsection (5)(a).
(6) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), the commission may not make a credit or refund unless the sexually
explicit business or escort service subject to the tax
imposed by this chapter files a claim with the commission
within three years of the date of overpayment.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), the commission
shall extend the period for a taxpayer to file a claim under
Subsection (6)(a) if:
(i) the three-year period under Subsection (6)(a)
has not expired; and
(ii) the commission and the sexually explicit business or escort service subject to the tax imposed by
this chapter sign a written agreement:
(A) authorizing the extension; and
(B) providing for the length of the extension.
2004

59-27-108. Penalties and interest.
An owner or operator of a sexually explicit business or escort
service that fails to comply with this chapter is subject to:
(1) penalties provided in Section 59-1-401; and
(2) interest provided in Section 59-1-402.
2004

TITLE 60
SALES [REPEALED]
TITLE 61
SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE
DIVISION
Chapter
1. Utah Uniform Securities Act.
2. Division of Real Estate.
2a. Real Estate Recovery Fund.
2b. Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and Certification.
2c. Utah Residential Mortgage Practices Act.
2d. Utah High Cost Home Loan Act.
3. Securities and Securities Transfer Agents [Repealed].
4. Take-Over Offers for Equity Securities [Repealed].
5. Corporate Take-Overs [Repealed].
6. Control Shares Acquisitions Act.
CHAPTER 1
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
Section
61-1-1.
61-1-2.

Fraud unlawful.
Investment adviser - • Unlawful acts.

Addendum C

Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, makes an order
requiring a parent to furnish support or necessary food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, or other remedial care for his
child, and the parent fails to do so, proof of noncompliance
shall be prima facie evidence of contempt of court.
(2) Proof of noncompliance may be demonstrated by showing that:
(a) the order was made, and filed with the district
court; and
(b) the parent knew of the order because:
(i) the order was mailed to the parent at his
last-known address as shown on the court records;
(ii) the parent was present in court at the time the
order was pronounced;
(iii) the parent entered into a written stipulation
and the parent or counsel for t h e parent was sent a
copy of the order;
(iv) counsel was present in court and entered into
a stipulation which was accepted and the order based
upon the stipulation was then sent to counsel for the
parent; or
(v) the parent was properly served and failed to
answer.
(3) Upon establishment of a prima facie case of contempt
under Subsection (2), the obligor under the child support order
has the burden of proving inability to comply with the child
support order.
(4) A court may, in addition to other available sanctions,
withhold, suspend, or restrict the use of driver's licenses,
professional and occupational licenses, and recreational licenses and impose conditions for reinstatement upon a finding
that:
(a) an obligor has:
(i) made no payment for 60 days on a current
obligation of support as set forth in an administrative
or court order and, -thereafter, h a s failed to make a
good faith effort under the circumstances to make
payment on the support obligation in accordance with
the order; or
(ii) made no payment for 60 days on an arrearage
obligation of support as set forth in a payment schedule, written agreement with the Office of Recovery
Services, or an administrative or judicial order and,
thereafter, has failed to make a good faith effort
under the circumstances to make payment on the
arrearage obligation in accordance with the payment
schedule, agreement, or order; and
(iii) not obtained a judicial order staying enforcement of the support or arrearage obligation for which
the obligor would be otherwise delinquent;
(b) a custodial parent has:
(i) violated a parent-time order by denying contact
for 60 days between a noncustodial parent and a child
and, thereafter, h a s failed to make a good faith effort
under the circumstances to comply with a parenttime order; and
(ii) not obtained a judicial order staying enforcement of the parent-time order; or
(c) an obligor or obligee, after receiving appropriate
notice, has failed to comply with a subpoena or order
relating to a paternity or child support proceeding.
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CHAPTER 33
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Section
78-33-1.
78-33-2.

78-33-7
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Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect.
Rights, status, legal relations under instruments
or statutes may be determined.

Section
78-33-3.
78-33-4.
78-33-5.
78-33-6.
78-33-7.
78-33-8.
78-33-9.
78-33-10.
78-33-11.
78-33-12.
78-33-13.

Contracts.
Suit by fiduciary or representative.
Court's general powers.
Discretion to deny declaratory relief.
Appeals and reviews.
Supplemental relief.
Trial of issues of fact.
Costs.
Parties.
Chapter to be liberally construed.
"Person'' defined.

78-33-1.

J u r i s d i c t i o n of district courts — Form — Effect.
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations,
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree.
1953
78-33-2.

R i g h t s , s t a t u s , legal relations under instrum e n t s or s t a t u t e s m a y b e determined.
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract,
or whose rights, s t a t u s or other legal relations are affected by
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may
have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other
legal relations thereunder.
1953
78-33-3. Contracts.
A contract may be construed either before or after there has
been a breach thereof.
1953
78-33-4. Suit b y fiduciary or representative.
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee,
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant,
lunatic or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal
relations in respect thereto:
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or,
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or trustees
to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their
fiduciary capacity; or,
(3) to determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of
construction of wills and other writings.
1953
78-33-5. Court's g e n e r a l p o w e r s .
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 78-33-4
does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers
conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any proceeding where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
1953
78-33-6. D i s c r e t i o n to d e n y declaratory relief.
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.
1953
78-33-7. A p p e a l s a n d r e v i e w s .
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees.
1953

JUDICIAL CODE

78-33-8

78-33-8. S u p p l e m e n t a l relief.
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction
to grant the relief. If t h e application is deemed sufficient, the
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party,
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgm e n t or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be
granted forthwith.
1953
78-33-9. Trial of i s s u e s of fact.
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and
determined in the same m a n n e r as issues of fact are tried and
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the
proceeding is pending.
1953
78-33-10. C o s t s .
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
1953
78-33-11. P a r t i e s .
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any
proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal or
county ordinance or franchise such municipality or county
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if
a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the
proceeding and be entitled to be heard.
1953
78-33-12. Chapter to b e liberally^ c o n s t r u e d .
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status and other legal relations; and is to be
liberally construed and administered.
1953
78-33-13. "Person" defined.
The word " p e r s o n " wherever used in this chapter, shall be
construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or
other corporation of any character whatsoever.
1953
CHAPTER 34
EMINENT DOMAIN
Section
78-34-1.
78-34-2.
78-34-3.
78-34-4.
78-34-5.
78-34-6.
78-34-7.
78-34-8.
78-34-9.

78-34-10.
78-34-11.
78-34-12.
78-34-13.
78-34-14.
78-34-15.

Uses for which right may be exercised.
Estates and rights t h a t may be taken.
Private property which may be taken.
Conditions precedent to taking.
Right of entry for survey and location.
Complaint — Contents.
Who may appear and defend.
Powers of court or judge.
Occupancy of premises pending action — Deposit
paid into court — Procedure for payment of
compensation.
Compensation and damages — How assessed.
When right to damages deemed to have accrued.
When title sought found defective — Another
action allowed.
Payment of award — Bond from railroad to
secure fencing.
Distribution of award — Execution — Annulment of proceedings on failure to pay.
J u d g m e n t of condemnation — Recordation —
Effect.

Section
78-34-16.

78-34-17.
78-34-18.
78-34-19.

78-34-20.
78-34-21.
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Substitution ofbond for deposit paid into court —
Abandonment of action by condemner — Conditions of dismissal.
Rights of cities and towns not affected.
When right of way acquired — Duty of party
acquiring.
Action to set aside condemnation for failure to
commence or complete construction within reasonable time.
Sale of property acquired by eminent domain.
Dispute resolution.

78-34-1. U s e s for w h i c h r i g h t m a y b e e x e r c i s e d .
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public
uses:
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the
United States.
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the
state, and ail other public uses authorized by the Legislature.
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any
county, city or incorporated town, or board of education;
reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for
conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any
county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of
any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the
banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and
widening, deepening or straightening their channels;
roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the
benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the
inhabitants thereof.
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries,
bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads,
roads for transportation by traction engines or road
locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and
railroads and street railways for public transportation.
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches,
flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of
persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the
reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or
for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming
of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams
not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution.
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches,
flumes, pipes and dumping places to facilitate the milling,
smelting or other reduction of ores, or the working of
mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including
minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the
deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills,
smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or from
mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including
minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal pipelines,
tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or
formation in any land for the underground storage of
natural gas, and in connection therewith such other
interests in property as may be required adequately to
examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such underground natural gas storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals
in solution; also any occupancy in common by the owners
or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines,
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the
reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit or
conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and
farms.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

BUSHCO, d.b.a. Babydolls Escorts,
VALLEY RECREATION, Inc. d.b.a. Kitty's
Escort and Angel's Escort, THE D. HOUSE,
LLC d.b.a. The Doll House
Plaintiffs,
AMERICAN BUSH, INC. and DENALI,
LLC, d.b.a. SOUTHERN EXPOSURE,

FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 040911691

Plaintiffs in Intervention,
v.

Judge Medley

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and
PAM HENDRICKSON, R. BRUCE
JOHNSON, PALMER DEPAULIS, and
MARK B. JOHNSON, in their official
capacities, as members of the Utah State Tax
Commission
Defendants.

1*7/0/ A

On June 4, 2007, before the Honorable Tyrone Medley, Plaintiffs' and Defendants' cross
motions for summary judgment came before this court for oral argument. Andrew McCullough
appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs and Susan L. Barnum and Jaysen R. Oldroyd, Assistant Utah
Attorneys General, appeared on behalf of Defendants.
The Court heard oral argument on both Motions, considered the written Memoranda filed
by both parties, reviewed the file, and made an oral ruling on the record on June 5, 2007; based
thereon the Court now makes the following conclusions of law, based on the undisputed material
facts.
1.

The escort service Plaintiffs are entitled to First Amendment protection because they
incorporate dancing services; thus for purposes of these cross-motions all the Plaintiffs
will be treated as if they are entitled to the same First Amendment protection.

2.

The sexually explicit business tax set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-101 et. seq. is
content-neutral for First Amendment purposes because it falls on any business involving
nudity in its services.

3.

The sexually explicit business tax and the escort service tax are content-neutral, and the
test for content-neutral laws that impact expressive conduct such as nude dancing set
forth in O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) applies. The statute meets the
four O'Brien prongs as follows:
a.

First, the legislature has the power to enact this law. The state can impose taxes
and this prong is not in dispute.
2

b.

Second, the law furthers a substantial government interest. As stated in the
statute, the purpose of the tax is to raise revenue for sex offender treatment. The
Legislature heard evidence that there is insufficient funding for sex offender
treatment and sex offender recidivism rates are high without treatment and these
reasons constitute a substantial government interest.

c.

Third, the tax and statute is unrelated to the suppression of the expression that
may be affected because seeking additional sex offender treatment funding is
unrelated to the suppression of expression. Based on the evidence before the
legislature the tax is designed to address negative secondary effects.

d.

Fourth, the impact of the statute is not greater than necessary to achieve the
desired result because the impact is de minimis; the restriction is not a complete
restriction on nude dancing but only a 10% tax on conduct involving nudity, and
so is no greater than necessary.

4.

The tax on sexually explicit businesses and escort services does not violate the First
Amendment.

5.

The tax on sexually explicit businesses and escort services also does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not affect
fundamental rights, and the statute has a rational basis, which serves a substantial and
legitimate government purpose of crime prevention by funding sex offender treatment.

3

6.

Based on these conclusions, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

7.

Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants.

DATED this

3

day of

, 2007.

BY THE COURT:

TyroneMedley
ThirdUJistnct Court Judge

^r~*^

Approved as to Fo

Andrew McCimbugh
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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I hereby certify that on this ^—'-> day of June, 2007,1 caused to be served by U.S. mail,
postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following:

W ANDREW MCCULLOUGH
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES LLC
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By Interoffice Mail to:
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84134
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